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INTRODUCTION 
The creation of new ventures is the source of most new employment in an economy 
(Audretsch & Thurik, 2001), new industries (Schumpeter, 1950), innovations (McKelvie et al., 
2018), and solutions to both social (Williams & Shepherd, 2016) and environmental (York et al., 
2016) problems. However, most management research begins with the existence of an 
organization and then attempts to explain heterogeneity amongst organizations in terms of 
various attributes (e.g., Hillman et al., 2009), forms (e.g., Dunning & Lundan, 2008), and 
outcomes (e.g., Covin et al., 2006). Research on starting up a new venture increases our 
understanding of the creation and emergence of organizations that eventually become the topic 
of the majority of management research.  
However, there are a number of challenges in researching the starting up of new 
organizations. First, there are challenges in sourcing samples for investigation, since researchers 
need to identify something before it has been created. Second, many efforts at starting a new 
venture are abandoned and many new ventures are terminated (Ucbasaran et al., 2013); this 
compounds the sample selection process and makes research on startups challenging due to 
potential biases (McGrath, 1999). Finally, traditional measures and research designs are unlikely 
to apply to pre- and early-stage organizations and the introduction of new measures and designs 
are typically considered high-risk research. While these challenges do not undermine, and they 
may actually reflect, the value of the opportunity to research new venture creation, they have 
resulted in multiple, fragmented streams of research. Consequently, current research does not yet 
provide a cohesive body of knowledge to act as a foundation of, to link with, and to inform the 
substantial literature on established organizations.1 
                                               
1 We note that the last comprehensive review on the topic was by Shook, Prime and McGee (2003). Even then, their 
review was narrowly focused on enterprising individuals and future research on individual judgement. There have 
been other more recent reviews focusing on an important but narrow topics within the broader domain, e.g., the lean 
startup methodology (Bortolini et al., Forthcoming; Shepherd & Gruber, Forthcoming). Moreover, while new 
venture creation is central to entrepreneurship research, we note that the former is a subset of the latter.  
In this paper, we review research on the starting up of a new organization, organize the 
information into an overarching framework, and use the framework to propose opportunities for 
future research. In the following sections, we first detail our method for paper selection. Second, 
we review the papers based on 10 inductively-generated sub-topics and three overarching 
themes. Third, we offer a research agenda primarily based on connecting the key constructs. 
METHOD FOR SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
We conducted a systematic review by first selecting keywords, journals, and a period for 
the investigation. Because we wanted the initial search to be broad, we searched for the 
keywords (i.e., title, keywords, and abstract) “new firm”, “new venture”, “new business”, 
“start*”, “found”, “create”, and “launch”. We searched in the top management (i.e., Academy of 
Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, 
Strategic Management Journal, Organization Science, Journal of Management, and Journal of 
Management Studies) and the top entrepreneurship journals (i.e., Journal of Business Venturing, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, and the Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal). The 
timespan for the search was 2003-2019, because the last review of new venture creation was 
conducted in 2003 (Shook et al., 2003). This initial search led to 346 papers. 
We then read each paper to assess whether the paper should be included in the review and 
began to categorize the papers. We excluded 194 papers for several reasons. First, consistent 
with other reviews, we excluded papers that were commentaries, introductions to special issues, 
review papers (including meta-analyses), replications, research method papers, retractions, and 
teaching cases (n = 44). Second, because we decided to take a management perspective, we 
excluded papers that were not at the individual-, team-, or organization- level of analysis such as 
sociological studies of populations, economic studies at the national and regional level of 
analysis, and studies of rates of new venture creation (n = 82). Third, because there are 
differences between new independent-ventures and new corporate-ventures (i.e., differences 
between de novo and de alio ventures [Carroll, et al., 1996]) and our interest lies on starting up 
from scratch, we excluded papers that focused on corporate entrepreneurship, spin offs, and 
portfolios of ventures (n = 25). Finally, we excluded papers on topics not directly about the 
startup of a new venture such as  papers focused on opportunity, self-employment, ventures 
beyond their earliest stages, venture funding (that often relates to scaling rather than starting a 
venture) and other topics (n = 93). After these exclusions, we fully reviewed the remaining 143 
papers (but were not able to cite all of them in this review article). 
We inductively categorized the relevant papers into 10 categories that represent the 
primary new-venture topic of the paper: (1) Lead founder, (2) Founding team, (3) Social 
relationships, (4) Cognitions, (5) Emergent organizing, (6) New venture strategy, (7) 
Organizational emergence, (8) New venture legitimacy, (9) Founder exit, and (10) 
Entrepreneurial environment (interacting with the levels of analysis included in this review). We 
further organized these categories into an overarching framework (Figure 1) that provides 
coherence to the review and offers a visual representation of where future research can make 
important contributions to our knowledge of starting up new ventures. As illustrated in Figure 1, 
there are three major stages of starting up a new (independent) venture—co-creating a startup, 
organizing a startup, and performing a startup. In the co-creating stage a lead entrepreneur 
typically forms a founding team and this group uses its social relationships and cognitions to 
engage in co-constructing a new venture with its community of inquiry—an informal body of 
stakeholders with a shared interest in a potential opportunity (Autio et al., 2013; Shepherd, 
2015)—and begins to attract potential stakeholders. In the organizing stage, the new venture 
establishes operational activities and formulates and enacts a strategy that, along with the 
founding team, the community of inquiry, and the external environment, impact the critical 
outcomes of legitimacy, organizational emergence, and founder exit. In the performing stage, the 
outcomes from the previous stage are inter-related such that the organization’s emergence 
facilitates legitimacy and founder exit, and these outcomes feedback into the other stages of the 
model. All stages are influenced by, and influence, the external environment. The dashed arrows 
represent feedback mechanisms.  In the final section, we offer a future research agenda around 
exploring the arrows between boxes as opportunities for substantial contributions. 
-----Insert Figure 1 about here----- 
CO-CREATING A STARTUP VENTURE 
Lead Founder and Starting Up a New Venture 
A founder refers to a person who creates a venture, that is, facilitates the emergence of a 
new venture. Even in case of ventures created by a team, individual founder attributes are 
important for new-venture creation, especially the attributes of the lead founder (Wasserman, 
2017), who is the member of the founding team most responsible for managing the startup 
process. The literature informed us that founders are heterogeneous in experiences, employment 
position, entrepreneurial imaginativeness, motivation and identity, affective responses, and 
enduring characteristics. These varying founder-attributes affect new venture creation. 
First, startups are founded by individuals with specific experiences and these 
experiences are varied as are their impact on the starting up of new ventures. For example, 
for the creation of a new venture, a founder with managerial experience—knowledge about 
operating a business—is particularly valuable in the pursuit of opportunities in highly dynamic 
external environments whereas a founder with industry experience—previously worked in the 
same industry as the new venture—is particularly valuable in the pursuit of opportunities in less 
dynamic external environments (Dencker & Gruber, 2015). Entrepreneurial experience also 
appears to be an important attribute for founders. For example, Forbes (2005) found that 
founders who had previously started another venture (and those who were older) were quicker in 
making decisions and committing their venture to action than were founders without 
entrepreneurial experience (and those who were younger). While most studies of the implications 
of entrepreneurial experience do not consider the level of success associated with those 
experiences, one study found that new ventures created by founders with entrepreneurial 
experience performed better (in terms of survival time) than founders without entrepreneurial 
experience, regardless of whether the prior experience was with a successful or a failed venture.   
However, founder experience is not necessarily an unambiguous blessing; a founder’s 
experience with a product market, geographic market, or resource will focus his or her attention 
towards those domains and perhaps remain blind to other opportunities and possibilities beyond 
these domains (Fern et al., 2012; Gruber et al., 2013; Shepherd et al., 2017).  Similarly, although 
individuals returning from another country to their home country to start a business have 
different experiences from those who never left their home country (and a higher stock of initial 
social capital [Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2010]), it appears that founders with this experience 
abroad were slower at the initial stage of the entrepreneurial process—from initial conception of 
the potential idea to the launch of the new venture to exploit it—than those founders without 
such experience (Qin et al., 2017). Moreover, Levesque and Minniti (2006) proposed that there is 
a positive relationship between age and starting a new venture up to a point after which further 
increases in age are associated with a decreased likelihood of starting a new venture. 
Second, founders can arise from employee entrepreneurship—“the intra-industry 
founding of a new venture by an individual who previously worked for an incumbent firm [a 
firm in the same industry as the startup]” (Ganco, 2013: 666). In employee entrepreneurship, the 
extent to which the new venture’s knowledge domain overlaps with the knowledge domain of the 
founder’s previous employer can benefit the new venture in the transfer of effective routines and 
the recognition of subsequent potential opportunities (although there is evidence of diminishing 
returns, and perhaps even negative returns, to the new venture from considerable overlap with 
the founder’s previous employer) (Basu et al., 2015). Although it seems that it would be the star 
performers who leave employment to found their own firm, the relationship is more complex. 
Star performers are more likely to leave employment to start their own firm when the employer 
has a low compensation dispersion system (Carnahan et al., 2012). High earning individuals (i.e., 
star performers) are actually less likely to leave their employer than low earners, but if they do 
leave, they are more likely to start their own venture (the low earners seek employment 
elsewhere; Campbell et al., 2012). Moreover, leaving employees are more likely to start their 
own venture, rather than seek employment elsewhere, when the knowledge they have obtained is 
more complex, i.e., there are many interdependencies between the knowledge components such 
that a change in one component impacts the way another component works (Ganco, 2013). 
Third, people with entrepreneurial imaginativeness are more likely to start up a new 
venture because “entrepreneurs come to imagine the opportunity for novel ventures” 
(Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010: 539). Entrepreneurial imaginativeness refers to “a cognitive skill 
that combines the ability of imagination with the knowledge needed to stimulate various task-
related scenarios in entrepreneurship (Kier & McMullen, 2018: 2266). This cognitive skill is 
useful in new venture creation because it helps to recognize or stimulate the construction of a 
potential opportunity, which can be tested and refined as the basis of a new venture (Dimov, 
2007; Shepherd et al., 2012). Perhaps some of the knowledge needed to create the various 
scenarios for entrepreneurial imaginativeness comes from the managerial, industry, 
entrepreneurial, and employment experiences detailed above. 
Fourth, an individual needs to be motivated to found a new venture, which is often 
reflected in the founder’s identity and passion. Farmer, Yao and Kung-McIntyre (2011: 246) 
explored founder’s entrepreneurial identity aspiration—“a possible but unrealized future 
entrepreneurial self”—and found that those who had a stronger entrepreneurial identity 
aspiration engaged in more nascent entrepreneurial behaviors and even more so for founders who 
had prior startup experience than those who did not have such experience. It has been proposed 
that there are three ideal types of entrepreneurial social identity, which help explain the logic and 
actions of the new ventures created (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011): (1) The Darwinian identity 
reflects founders who consider themselves unique, put their self-interest at the core of the new 
venture, pursue private goals, and use a conventional business logic; (2) The Communitarian 
identity reflects founders who focus their actions based on a proximal social group and have a 
community-driven logic; and (3) The Missionary identity reflects founders who have a highly 
inclusive notion of stakeholders, focus on the society-at-large, and have a mission-driven logic. 
Founders also have entrepreneurial passion, which acts to motivate the new venture 
creation process. Entrepreneurial passion is an “intense positive inclination towards 
entrepreneurial activities salient to an individual’s identity… we do not conceptualize passion as 
a trait but rather as an affective and motivational phenomenon that an entrepreneur experiences 
when engaging in identity relevant activities” (Murnieks et al., 2016: 470). This passion provides 
the motivation for an individual to perform the tasks required to create a new venture. Indeed, 
entrepreneurial passion contributes to higher entrepreneurial self-efficacy, which strengthens the 
intention to start up a new venture (Huyghe et al., 2016). Interestingly, obsessive scientific 
passion—an identity connection with the scientific role—leads to a strong affective commitment 
to the current organization and thus weakens the intention for a startup (Huyghe et al., 2016).   
Fifth, the founder’s affect (e.g., positive emotions) plays a role in starting up a new 
venture. For example, positive dispositional affect facilitates creativity and creativity generates 
innovative outputs during the new venture creation process; the strength of both these 
relationships depended on the dynamism of the external environment (Baron & Tang, 2011).  
Positive dispositional affect refers to the founder’s general tendency to experience positive 
emotions, such as enthusiasm and excitement (consistent with George & Zhou, 2002) and, unlike 
positive state affect, is relatively enduring across time, contexts, and situations. However, a 
founder’s positive dispositional affect may not always lead to positive outcomes. Baron, 
Hmieleski and Henry (2012) proposed that positive dispositional affect has an inverted u-shaped 
relationship with performance on many of the tasks related to new venture creation, such as 
opportunity recognition, opportunity evaluation, and entrepreneurial decision making. 
Finally, individuals’ personalities can help explain those who found a new venture.  
Specifically, in investigating the leaders of both high-tech startups and established firms, 
Peterson, Walumbwa, Byron and Myrowitz (2009) found that the positive psychological traits of 
hope, optimism and resilience have a positive association with the transformational leadership of 
the founder, which in turn had a positive relationship with firm performance. The positive 
psychological trait of hope refers to the perception that they have a path to a desired end goal and 
the agency to move down that path (Huang et al.,, forthcoming; Peterson et al., 2009), optimism 
refers to a generalized belief that good things will happen (Scheier & Carver, 1985), and 
resilience refers to the capacity to maintain positive functioning in the face of adverse events 
(Bonanno, 2005). Transformational leadership, the outcome of these positive psychological 
traits, has a positive impact on the performance of new ventures and involves four attributes: (1) 
idealized influence in which the founder’s followers identify with the founder and try to emulate 
him or her, (2) inspirational motivation in which the founder is able to provide a strong vision of 
the future that motivates followers, (3) intellectual stimulation in which the founder enables 
followers to make the most of their potential, and (4) individualized consideration in which the 
founder helps followers to meet their individualized needs for personal growth (Peterson et al., 
2009). Personality can also be bundled with personal resources, and the environment to explain 
activities and challenges in the new venture creation process (Korunka, Frank, Lueger, & 
Mugler, 2003). Specifically, the founders’ tendencies to value “change, the new, and the 
different” (i.e., novelty) positively impact firm performance and more so for those firms that are 
younger and smaller (Ling et al., 2007).  
Founding Teams and Starting Up a New Venture 
A founding team refers to a group of individuals who collectively create a venture. 
Founding teams have often varied experiences, are diverse in different attributes, sometimes 
have prior shared experience, and are influenced by structure. 
First, founding teams differ in the level and nature of their experiences, which 
impact the process of starting a new venture. For example, for newly created venture capital 
firms, those that had top management teams with greater experience in venture capital, senior 
management, and consulting, were more successful than their inexperienced counterparts 
(Walske & Zacharakis, 2009). Moreover, in assessing top management teams of new ventures, 
senior venture capitalists emphasized, firstly, the team’s industry experience, secondly, its level 
of management education, and, thirdly, the team’s leadership experience (Franke et al., 2006). 
Another study also confirmed that teams with greater entrepreneurial and management 
experience were able to identify a greater number of market opportunities (Gruber et al., 2012). 
It also appears that founding teams that have financial management competence—skills, 
experience, and ability to overcome resource constraints—are better able to overcome obstacles 
to new venture creation and growth (Brinckmann et al., 2011). Furthermore, new venture teams 
with greater technological experience magnify the positive relationships between, firstly, the 
diversity of their industry experience and, secondly, the external sources of knowledge tapped, 
with the variety of potential opportunities that they can identify (Gruber et al., 2013). 
Second, diversity is important in founding teams. For example, team diversity in 
education background is beneficial (Gruber et al., 2012) and venture capitalists value educational 
heterogeneity, so long as one of the members has management education (Franke et al., 2006). 
Despite widespread knowledge of the importance of heterogeneity in the founding team (Bruton 
et al., 1997; Kim & Aldrich, 2005; Leung et al., 2013), it appears that founders’ biased decision 
making—overoptimism and self-serving attributions—leads them to choose co-founders that 
have similar beliefs, values, and status, thus creating a homophilious founding team (Parker, 
2009). However, we have some evidence that more diversity in the founding team might not 
always be a good thing. For example, dispersion of ability within the founding team has an 
inverted u-shaped relationship with startup performance (Hoogendoorn et al., 2017). Also, while 
diversity enhances performance in a competitive commercialization context it does not appear to 
do so in a cooperative community environment, nor in the pursuit of an innovation strategy; in 
such contexts a technically focused management team performs better (Eesley et al., 2014). 
Interestingly, new venture emergence is facilitated by new venture teams that involve a couple 
(i.e., a spouse) but obstructed by teams that contain biological linkages; this negative biological 
effect is less negative when financial investment is low (Brannon et al., 2013). 
Finally, founding team members that have prior shared experience are well 
positioned to manage some of the challenges of starting up a new venture. New ventures 
managed by a team in which some of the members have previously worked together in the same 
company have a shared understanding that promotes implementation speed (Beckman, 2006) and 
overall performance, but less so when the shared experience is for a task or industry different 
from the new venture’s tasks and industry and less so as the founding team gains its own shared 
operating experiences (Zheng et al., 2016). Relatedly, Leung, Foo and Chaturvedi (2013) found 
that founding teams with shared prior experience were able to create a human resource value 
system for the new venture that was internally consistent, which enabled the building of shared 
collective perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors amongst the members. Diverse founding teams in 
which members have also previously worked together are more likely to pursue an exploration 
strategy, change the venture’s founding idea, and grow more quickly (Beckman, 2006). 
A mechanism underlying the importance of the prior shared experience and the 
accumulated operating experiences shared by the founding team, is the development of a 
transactive memory system. A transactive memory system refers to the sum of the individual 
knowledge and shared understanding of where expertise among team members exists (Lewis, 
2003; Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000)—i.e., “who knows what” (Zheng, 2012). There is a 
positive relationship between the founding team’s transactive memory system and new venture 
performance, which is magnified by task similarity—the perceptual closeness of tasks—and 
intra-team trust—the shared perception of trust amongst team members (Zheng, 2012). The 
founding team’s transactive memory system can also spur an entrepreneurial orientation—the 
propensity for the new venture to be innovative, risk taking and proactive (Covin & Slevin, 
1991)—and this positive relationship is magnified by the intra-trust of the founding team, the 
organicity of the structure, and the dynamism of the external environment (Dai, et al., 2016). 
Social Relationships and Starting Up a New Venture 
A social relationship refers to a positive inter-personal association—a tie between two or 
more people. Social relationships are reflected in (1) the nature of a founder’s social network, (2) 
the social capital embedded in the founder’s network, (3) the intangible resources that founders 
can access via their network, and (4) the inter-personal interactions within the new venture. 
First, founders’ relationships are represented by social networks and the nature of 
these social networks varies across founders and founding teams. The network contacts of 
founders are perceived to be greater when the network contact offers greater resource 
multiplicity—“the simultaneous, prospective availability of multiple resources”—and the 
benefits of resource multiplicity are magnified by both age-based and gender-based interpersonal 
similarity between the founder and the resource provider (Grossman et al., 2012: 1765). 
Important people in a founders’ network are the referrer (i.e., the person who connects an 
entrepreneur with a resource owner) and the ultimate resource owner. Specifically, founders’ 
likelihood of acquiring resources are higher when (1) the tie between the referrer and the 
resource owner is strong, especially when the tie between the founder and referrer is also strong, 
and (2) the referrer and the resource owners have high prior knowledge of the venture’s 
technology or product (Zhang et al., 2010). Interestingly, the resource owners’ poor prior 
knowledge compensates for weak ties between the founder and the referrer and between the 
referrer and the resource owner (Zhang et al., 2010). 
Engel, Kaandorp and Elfring (2017) go one step further and conceptualize entrepreneurial 
networking not as a mere facilitator of entrepreneurial action but as a part of this action. 
Specifically, entrepreneurial networking is portrayed as an agentic behavior, under high 
uncertainty, and includes assessment of the available means within the existing network of ties, 
negotiating pre-commitments with stakeholders, and constantly changing the portfolio of ties 
committed to the venture. Although it would seem that the larger the founders’ network the 
better it is for the venture, there appear to be diminishing marginal returns to network size, in 
access to funding, information, and business contacts (Semrau & Werner, 2014). Over and above 
the size of the network, other important factors in relationship quality (i.e., stronger ties), are 
trust and commitment; both of which facilitate access to resources under favorable terms 
(McFadyen & Cannella, 2004; Semrau & Werner, 2014; Steier & Greenwood, 2000). Indeed, 
both the social network size and the relational capital (strength of the ties) were found to be 
positively related to progress in the new venture creation process (De Carolis et al., 2009). 
Importantly, new ventures also benefit from founder networks that are heterogeneous and high in 
status (Zheng et al., 2010). A heterogenous network provides access to more diverse information 
and resources, and a high-status network is an important social signal of the venture’s quality. 
Second, founders can benefit from social capital (i.e., the goodwill created through 
social relations [De Carolis et al. 2009]) and this social capital can have a variety of sources 
and benefits. For example, founders experienced with global markets (as a returning migrant or 
via experience with a multi-national enterprise) typically have a higher stock of initial social 
capital than founders without global-market experiences (Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2010). It 
appears that an important source of social capital is the family. Founders seek initial funding 
from their family rather than from other investors when they anticipate low levels of family 
interference in the business (Au & Kwan, 2009). This shows that there are benefits (e.g., easier 
access to capital) and costs (e.g., potential interference) that arise from relying on family 
relationships in creating the new venture. Another study also captured the apparent tradeoffs that 
founders face with regards to involving their family in starting up a business. Edelman and 
colleagues (2016) found that the scope of startup activities was narrower with the involvement of 
family financial-capital but broader with higher family social-capital. Interestingly, the benefits 
of family social capital (for the scope of startup activities) were magnified by family 
cohesiveness. Family involvement in the governance of early stage new ventures has also been 
associated with higher probability of raising debt funding and with the amount of funding 
obtained (Edelman et al., 2016). 
Third, founders’ social relationships can provide intangible resources. For example, 
close ties can provide entrepreneurial inspiration for the founder (Souitaris et al., 2007), which 
can enhance the chances of new venture survival, especially when founders take over an existing 
business, spend considerable time on their business, and lack prior entrepreneurship experience 
(De Jong & Marsili, 2015). Another intangible resource stemming from social relationships is 
guidance. Guided preparation—i.e., using assistance from an outside advisor to startup the 
venture—has an inverted u-shaped relationship to new ventures’ long term growth (Chrisman et 
al., 2005). That is, long-term growth increases with the amount of guided preparation to a point 
and thereafter more guided preparation is associated with less long-term growth. A similar form 
of help to guidance, also derived by social relationships, is help from venture advocates. Venture 
advocates are “local venture-community members, as potential stakeholders, that help founders 
in the developmental stages of emerging enterprises” and have been found to be positively 
associated with a new venture’s likelihood of launch and survival (Saxton et al., 2016).  
Finally, social relationships occur within the structure of the new venture, e.g., 
among directors. New ventures are able to establish more quickly a diverse alliance portfolio 
when their board of directors is heterogeneous (i.e., directors have diverse backgrounds and 
networks), multiplex (i.e., directors form multiple types of relationships), and symmetrical 
(influence is evenly distributed) (Beckman et al., 2014). However, these benefits of the board 
members’ social relationships are undermined when central investors come to dominate the 
board (Beckman et al., 2014). What seems to be important is that members of the board of 
directors provide network relationships for the founding team. This enhanced network (of the 
board and founding team) is a source of relational pluralism—the extent to which a firm derives 
its meaning and possibility of action from other entities (Gulati, et al., 2010). 
Cognitions and Starting up a New Venture 
Founders’ cognitions refers to the mental operations underlying the co-construction of 
potential opportunities for starting up a new venture. We review our understanding on founders’ 
cognitions in terms of being driven by enduring characteristics, and by perception and judgment 
of information, and in terms of leading to biased decision making, the identification of potential 
opportunities, and from entrepreneurial intention to action. 
First, founders’ cognitions can be driven by relatively enduring characteristics—
intelligence and cognitive style. Baum and Bird (2010) proposed that there is a form of 
intelligence that is critical for success in new venture creation, which they call successful 
intelligence. Successful intelligence (when combined with entrepreneurial self-efficacy) is 
proposed to lead to swift actions that promote improved performance. This intelligence for new 
venture creation consists of three different types of intelligence: (1) practical intelligence, which 
is “the experience-based accumulation of skills, dispositions, tact knowledge, and the ability to 
apply some to solve everyday problems,” (2) analytical intelligence, which is the “ability to 
learn, remember, and retrieve information quickly,” and (3) creative intelligence which is the 
“ability to generate high quality novel ideas that meet the needs of a task or context” (Baum & 
Bird, 2010: 399–400). 
Another enduring attribute of founders that influences their cognitions is cognitive style. 
Cognitive style is a “higher-order heuristic that individuals employ when they approach, frame 
and solve problems” (Brigham et al., 2007: 31). People with different cognitive styles were 
confident for different tasks within the entrepreneurial process. Those who have a more intuitive 
cognitive style are more likely to observe signals and process information in a synthetic and 
holistic way (Olson, 1985); hence, they reported greater confidence in the new venture creation 
tasks of identifying and recognizing opportunities (Kickul et al., 2009).  In contrast, individuals 
with an analytical cognitive style processes information in a more linear and sequential way 
(Allinson & Hayes, 1996) and reported greater confidence in undertaking the venture creation 
tasks of assessing, evaluating, planning, and marshaling resources (Kickul et al., 2009). 
Second, entrepreneurial cognitions are informed by founders’ perception and 
judgement of information. Perception and judgement are related in terms of the founder’s 
cognitive model. Indeed, a founder’s judgement is based on the “shape and strength of the 
entrepreneur’s causal map” (i.e., perceptions) about achieving success in venture creation (Uygur 
& Kim, 2016: 186). Uygur and Kim (2016) propose that engaging in formal business planning 
facilitates entrepreneurial judgement because it helps founders to (1) become more selective in 
their decision making—refine the causal map to a smaller set of new venture success factors; (2) 
become more decisive—make venturing decisions more quickly; and (3) have greater 
conviction—faith in their entrepreneurial judgement. 
Third, founders’ cognitions can lead to biased decision making. Indeed, founders 
exhibit greater overconfidence than new venture managers who did not found the business 
(Forbes, 2005). Overconfidence refers to an individual’s over-statement of the correctness of 
their responses to difficult questions—they “do not know what they don’t know” (Forbes, 2005: 
624), which can be detrimental to venture creation efforts (Hayward et al., 2006). Indeed, 
Hyytinen, Latitonen and Rajarinen (2014) found that founders were overly optimistic when 
forecasting the survival of their venture. However, confidence in one’s capabilities to 
successfully perform entrepreneurial tasks is a robust predictor of the startup of a new venture 
(Townsend et al., 2010). 
Founders can also escalate commitment (money and time) to a venture that is bound to 
fail, which is obviously a biased decision. Huang, Souitaris, and Barsade (forthcoming) found 
that hope drives escalation of the founding team’s commitment to a failing venture, whereas fear 
leads to quitting that venture. Interestingly, when hope and fear were felt together, hope 
‘trumped’ fear, and the founding team kept escalating commitment.    
Fourth, a key application of entrepreneurial cognition is the identification of 
potential opportunities. Indeed, Edelman and Yli–Renko (2010) found that entrepreneurs’ 
subjective perception of opportunity mediates the relationship between the objective 
characteristics of the environment (i.e., environmental munificence) and the individual’s effort to 
start a new venture. These cognitive perceptions of a potential opportunity have a number of 
characteristics from a structuration perspective (i.e., the entrepreneur, the social system, and the 
potential opportunity co-evolve and co-construct [Seyb et al., 2019]): (1) entrepreneurial 
opportunities emerge through the interaction of the entrepreneur and a community of inquiry 
(Shepherd, 2015); (2) opportunity objectification, which refers to “the attribution of objective 
reality to an opportunity idea, so that the idea begins to be seen as an entity outside the observers 
mind” (Wood & McKinley, 2010: 70); (3) opportunity enactment as the establishment of the new 
venture is often characterized as the delivery of the first product or service, and (4) opportunity 
abandonment that involves the founder deciding not to pursue any further the particular potential 
opportunity and re-directing his or her attention elsewhere.   
The above structuration approach to the cognition related to potential opportunity relies 
on the inputs of others (Alvarez et al., 2015; Seyb et al., 2019). Who those others are also seems 
to matter in the cognitive process. For example, if a founder perceives that they are socially 
isolated from important actors such as other entrepreneurs, (a concept called social distance), 
then the interactions over a potential opportunity are perceived more abstractly, and thus, venture 
creation is perceived to be less likely to occur (vis-a-vis lower social distance and more concrete 
perceptions of the potential opportunity and new venture emergence) (Chen et al., 2018). Of 
course, the founder not only perceives opportunities but also threats during the startup process. A 
threat can cause stress and cognitive response through efforts to cope—avoidance coping and 
active coping. Avoidance coping involves taking respite from the threat by temporarily 
withdrawing from the situation or otherwise focusing on something else (Carver, Scheier, & 
Weintraub, 1989). Active coping involves directly addressing the threatening situation head on 
by doing something to resolve the problem. Avoidance coping on its own and in conjunction 
with active coping, can facilitate the entrepreneur’s psychological well-being (Uy et al., 2013). 
Finally, founders’ cognitions lead to intentions for actions critical to the process of 
starting up a new venture. In this case, the actions are the startup activities for organizational 
emergence. The extent of the time, effort, and other resources an individual invests in startup 
activities depends on the individual’s intention—readiness to perform a given behavior (Ajzen, 
1991), which in turn depends on the founders’ attitudes towards that behavior—the favorability 
of taking action, the perceived behavioral control (i.e., the ease or difficulty in performing the 
action), and the subjective norms (i.e., the opinions of a social reference group about engagement 
in the focal actions) (Kautonen et al., 2015; Souitaris et al., 2007). In this way an entrepreneurial 
intention involves a cognitive commitment towards actions to create a venture and these 
intentions can be stimulated by inputs from and perceptions of the environment. For example, 
attending an entrepreneurship program (an input from the environment) raises the intentions of 
science and engineering students to start a business (Souitaris et al., 2007). And founders’ 
perceived market heterogeneity strengthens their entrepreneurial intention because the diversity 
and breadth of the market provides potential opportunities for those who are innovative, 
proactive, and willing to take risks to create value (Fini et al., 2012). The motivation to startup a 
new venture and the startup decision-making expertise reinforce each other to promote the 
entrepreneur’s perception that they will achieve new venture success (Mitchell et al., 2008). 
However, a prosocial motivation—the desire to expend effort and other resources to help others 
(Batson, 1987; Grant, 2008), appears to slow down venture emergence in terms of assembling 
key resources, achieving first sale, raising external funding, and so on (Renko & Freeman, 2017). 
ORGANIZING THE STARTUP OF A NEW VENTURE 
Emergent Organizing and Starting Up a New venture 
Emergent organizing refers to the development of processes for configuring connections 
and activities to enhance the reliability and effectiveness of operations. Emergent organizing 
involves improvisation and engagement in activities critical to starting up a new venture, 
different (and dynamic) modes of organizing, and is influenced by founders’ logic. 
First, founders engage in actions to create new ventures, such as improvisation, and 
key activities for the startup process. The initial inspiration for the new venture may come 
from improvisation. Improvisation involves the fusion of design (e.g., planning) and action (i.e., 
emergent behaviors [Cunha et al., 2003; Weick, 1998]) or, stated differently, “the deliberate 
extemporaneous composition and execution of novel action” (Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008: 484). 
It seems that founders’ improvisational behaviors facilitate new venture performance (i.e., sales 
growth) for those founders with high entrepreneurial self-efficacy but diminish new venture 
performance for those founders with low entrepreneurial self-efficacy (Hmieleski & Corbett, 
2008). Regarding specific key-activities in the new venture creation process, Mueller, Volery 
and Siemens (2012) found that founders at startup focused mostly on exchanging information 
and opinions (36% of work time) and on engaging in more analytical and conceptual work (26% 
of work time). These efforts in startup focused on four key business functions: (1) human 
relations, (2) marketing (including sales and public relations, (3) administration, and (4) 
environmental monitoring (Mueller et al., 2012). 
Second, different modes of organizing feed into each other, but organizational 
emergence is not linear or sequential (Brush et al., 2008; Lichtenstein et al., 2007). 
Lichtenstein, Dooley, and Lumpkin (2006) identified three general modes of organizing, namely 
vision (i.e., identifying the opportunity), strategic organizing (i.e., making major decisions) and 
tactical organizing. The three modes of organizing are closely interrelated. Interestingly, an 
emergence event is stimulated by a change in tactical organizing first, which stimulates strategic 
organizing, which in turn stimulates a change of vision (Lichtenstein et al., 2006).  
Finally, organizational emergence can be influenced by the founders’ logic—
causation and effectuation. Effectuation is based on four primary principles: (1) The affordable 
loss principle that proposes that rather than relying on the expected return of actions (consistent 
with causation), entrepreneurs can focus on opportunity pursuit vis-à-vis how much they can 
afford to lose by taking this action. (2) The alliance principle proposes that rather than 
conducting competitor analyses (consistent with causation), the founder can enter into strategic 
alliances to gain pre-commitments from (potential) stakeholders. (3) The contingency principle 
proposes that rather than relying on pre-existing knowledge (consistent with causation), the 
founder can remain open to and exploit as an opportunity, unexpected events. (4) The control 
principle that proposes that rather than trying to predict an uncertain environment, the founder 
takes stock of his or her means and seeks to create possible ends from known means (Sarasvathy, 
2001). These effectuation principles can provide a response to environmental uncertainty, that is, 
while there is uncertainty about the external environment, there is perceived certainty internally 
about the new venture’s ability to respond to external changes (Jiang & Rüling, 2019). It appears 
that founders are more likely to use a causal logic when their previous career emphasized 
planning (i.e., an implicit assumption that the external environment is predictable) and more 
likely to be effectual when the founder came from a career that involved investing (Engel et al., 
2017). Moreover, experts are more likely to use effectuation in an entrepreneurial context while 
novices are more likely to use causation (Dew et al., 2009).   
Importantly, founders can engage both a causal and an effectual logic. Changes in the 
decision-making logic appear to be driven by the founders’ scoping decisions (how broad is the 
search for a potential opportunity to pursue [Klingebiel & Adner, 2015]), triggered by changes in 
the external and/or internal environment of the new venture (Reymen et al., 2015). By narrowing 
the scope of opportunity search founders were more willing to engage in causation and achieve 
efficiencies whereas an increase in the scope meant that founders were more likely to use 
effectuation and thus be more creative and experimental (Reymen et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, effectuation involves gaining the pre-commitment of potential stakeholders 
(Sarasvathy, 2001), who provide the effectual founder resources and legitimacy for their new 
ventures (Akemu et al., 2016). Pre-commitment of stakeholders is assisted by boundary objects, 
which are material artefacts representing the beliefs and values of the founder (e.g., an 
engineering drawing or a project timeline), “agreed and shared between communities of 
practice” (Akemu et al., 2016: 872). Boundary objects serve to connect loosely coupled actors 
across multiple domains to advance the new venture (see Nicolini et al., 2012; Yakura, 2002). 
Therefore, the founders’ discursive and symbolic practices to share, frame, and interact over 
boundary objects is critical for the emergence of new ventures (Seyb et al., 2019). 
New Venture Strategy and Starting Up a New Venture 
New venture strategy refers to the formulation, choice, and/or enactment of a particular 
strategic set-up and direction, with the venture’s business model being a key element. The  
business model refers to a description of the future venture and how it will function to achieve its 
goals (for more discussion on business models see Massa et al., 2017). New venture strategy 
involves planning, diversification, resource orchestration, entry mode, and innovativeness. 
First, planning impacts the starting up of new ventures (Dencker et al., 2009). 
Specifically, completing a formal plan increases the likelihood of new venture viability (early-
stage profitability) (Greene & Hopp, 2017) and enhances performance in terms of employment 
growth (Burke et al., 2010) and survival (when the plan is formed before speaking to customers 
or engaging in other organizing actives [Shane & Delmar, 2004]). It appears that the founders 
most likely to plan are those who are better educated and oriented toward growth, innovation, 
and external finance (Brinckmann & Kim, 2015). The type of environment the founders find 
themselves also impacts the benefits of different types of planning. In highly dynamic 
environments, founders gain most value from planning that is selective and quick, whereas in 
less dynamic environments, founders appear to be better off taking their time to spend longer on 
the planning task (Gruber, 2007). 
Founders also engage in plans that are not formal in nature. For example, entrepreneurial 
goal intentions (i.e., what the founder wants to achieve and is willing to invest to achieve) and 
venture creation is magnified by the founders use of action plans (Gielnik et al., 2014).  Action 
plans are mental simulations of the steps one needs to take to achieve a goal (Frese, 2009). These 
action plans also dampen the negative impact of positive fantasies (i.e., imagined futures 
independent of previous experiences) on venture creation; it appears action plans compensate for 
the motivational drain of positive fantasies (Gielnik et al., 2014). 
Second, diversification strategies can affect new venture survival and efficiency. 
Non-profit new ventures with a broad scope of products within and across industries (Tanriverdi 
& Lee, 2008) had increased chance of survival, vis-à-vis those with a narrow scope, but at the 
cost of organizational efficiency (Mendoza-Abarca & Gras, 2019). This positive relationship 
between product diversification and new venture survival is enhanced for ventures with high 
revenue diversification, i.e., a broad scope of revenue sources for these non-profit ventures, such 
as government grants, private donations, and goods sold (Mendoza-Abarca & Gras, 2019). 
Third, resource orchestration, through investment in human capital, leveraging 
R&D, and capitalizing on founders’ startup experience, can affect new venture growth and 
profits. Counterintuitively, in a study of R&D active startups, Symeonidou and Nicolaou (2018) 
found that deviating from rival’s resource investments (either below but even above the industry 
mean) reduces startup performance, in terms of growth and profits. However, high investment in 
human capital vis-a-vis rivals is less negatively related with performance for those new ventures 
that pursue a leveraging strategy focused on the innovation of new products and services and 
even less negative when founders have high startup experience (Symeonidou & Nicolaou, 2018).  
Fourth, current founders can pursue new opportunities via one of two entry modes—
within their existing venture or by starting-up a new venture; both represent entrepreneurial 
action but only the later leads to the startup of a new independent venture, which is the focus of 
the current review. Wiklund and Shepherd (2008) found that habitual founders—founders with 
prior startup experience—were more likely to pursue new opportunities through the creation of a 
new independent venture than novice founders—founders with no prior startup experience—who 
were more likely to pursue a potential opportunity within their existing venture. Portfolio 
entrepreneurs—founders who pursued more opportunities concurrently—were more educated, 
had more links with government support agencies, more frequently used their business networks, 
and had prior start up experience (i.e., habitual founders) (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2008). In a 
similar way, Zander (2007) theorized about the boundaries of the firm (i.e. why firms exist?) and 
suggested that actors create a new firm as opposed to an arm’s length market-contract, when 
other market participants are unable to understand or accept their perceived ‘means end 
framework’ (a coherent scenario of the unfolding of future market events). Block and colleagues 
(2013) noted that founders can decide to enter a market by acquiring an existing firm as opposed 
to starting up a new venture; startup of an independent firm was more likely for those founders 
who were more educated, younger, had greater risk-taking prosperity, and were more inventive. 
Finally, a new venture’s strategy can promote innovativeness, which can impact new 
venture performance, although the nature of the relationship is not as obvious as it might seem. 
That is, on the one hand, we would expect innovation to provide the new-venture benefits in 
terms of market power, cost efficiency, and capabilities such as absorptive capacity but on the 
other hand, innovativeness raises the liabilities of newness (Shepherd et al., 2000) which 
increases the likelihood of failure. Indeed, in a study of Finnish startups, Hyytinen, Pajarinen and 
Rouvinen (2015) found that innovativeness reduced the survival chances of new ventures and 
that this negative relationship is amplified by the entrepreneurs’ preference for risk. 
Furthermore, new ventures can be innovative by tapping into external knowledge. Indeed, 
open innovation is about “harnessing knowledge flows across firm boundaries” (Greul et al., 
2018: 392). To benefit from open innovation, new ventures can use inbound and outbound 
knowledge flows to build its capabilities (Chesbrough, 2003; Lee et al., 2010) mindful that there 
are risks associated with such an organizational openness (Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Enkel et al., 
2009). To balance the pros and cons of open innovation, Greul, West, and Bock (2018) proposed 
that new ventures will have less inbound knowledge flows and less unmonetized outbound 
knowledge flows when they have more technical capabilities and more proprietary intellectual 
property. Interestingly, user entrepreneurs—entrepreneurs that have “personal experience within 
product or service and derive benefit through use” (Shah & Tripsas, 2007: 124)—are more likely 
than traditional entrepreneurs of allowing unmonetized outbound knowledge flows (Greul et al., 
2018). Moreover, accidental entrepreneurs—entrepreneurs who “happen upon an idea through 
their own use” (Shah & Tripsas, 2007: 126) are more likely to allow unmonetized outbound 
knowledge flows than purposeful entrepreneurs (Greul et al., 2018). 
PERFORMING THE START UP OF A NEW VENTURE 
Organizational Emergence  
Organizational emergence refers to progress in the creation of a new venture. In 
theoretical terms, this new venture represents a new unit of analysis that produces outcomes 
beyond the actions of the individuals involved in the venture. Organizational emergence involves 
the linking of startup activities and is dynamic in nature.  
First, the engagement in and linking of startup activities provide a basis for 
organizational emergence. An organization emerges along four properties: (1) Intentionality, 
which refers to founders purposefully investing effort to create the new venture, (2) Resources, 
which form the building blocks of an organization, (3) Boundary, which delineates the 
formalized space of the organization, and (4) Exchange, which involves movement of inputs and 
outputs (e.g., resources) across the emerging organizational boundary (Brush et al., 2008; Katz & 
Gartner, 1988). By engaging in activities that establish the properties detailed above, founders 
are able to establish unique capabilities and stakeholder support to overcome the venture’s 
liabilities of newness (Delmar & Shane, 2004; Suchman, 1995). Counterintuitively, Brush and 
colleagues (2008) found that those founders who were able to quickly move through the new 
venture creation activities were less likely to continue organizing—i.e., they were more likely to 
terminate the pursuit of the new venture’s opportunity. 
Second, organizational emergence is a dynamic process. Changes throughout 
organizational emergence are driven by an adaptive tension between a perceived opportunity or a 
personal aspiration to start a business and the current state of the system (Lichtenstein et al., 
2007). It appears that the number of new venture creation activities over time is positively 
associated with new venture creation (Lichtenstein et al., 2007). However, and in what seems 
consistent with the surprising findings of Brush and colleagues (2008) reported above, the later 
these activities occur the more likely a new venture will be created. The startup process can 
become self-sustaining—enacting one activity offers the inputs for another activity. This self-
organization provides a momentum for new venture creation (Lichtenstein, 2000). 
New Venture Legitimacy 
New venture legitimacy refers to audiences’ assessment of the startup and its actions as 
desirable, acceptable, and appropriate. We investigate new venture legitimacy in terms of 
seeking endorsement, the role of founders in promoting legitimacy, how legitimacy can impact 
access to human and financial capital, and how new venture legitimacy occurs over time. 
First, new ventures often seek some form of endorsement to increase their 
legitimacy. There is usually considerable audience uncertainty about a new venture and its 
market offerings. To reduce this uncertainty and to gain legitimacy new ventures can signal 
information about quality and credibility through their actions and projected founder-experience, 
which are magnified by third-party endorsements (Courtney et al., 2016) and third-party 
affiliations (Plummer et al., 2016). For example, positive signals, such as managerial experience 
of the founder, having at least one product in the market, and operating from a commercial 
property, become more impactful for raising external funding, when they are backed by an 
affiliation with an incubator (Plummer et al., 2016). In a similar manner, Fisher, and colleagues 
(2017: 68) proposed three primary mechanisms via which new ventures can establish legitimacy: 
(1) identity mechanisms that “account for how a venture is portrayed”, (2) associative 
mechanisms that “reflect which organizations and individuals a new venture is tied with”, and (3) 
organizational mechanisms that “account for the attributes of the organization leaders and 
exposed organizational achievements”. Interestingly, third party endorsement can come in the 
form of certification—“a process in which a central institutional actor with authority or status 
formally acknowledges that a venture meets a particular standard”; certification can facilitate the 
transition from planned to operational venture, especially for those new ventures in low 
legitimacy sectors (Sine et al., 2007: 578). 
Second, as implied above, the founders can influence the legitimacy of their new 
ventures. For example, in a historical study of the magazine industry, Haveman, Habinek and 
Goodman (2012) concluded that skeptics to an emerging industry were not necessarily persuaded 
by the products’ legitimacy, but by the stature of the founders who created such products. As the 
industry evolved and gained general legitimacy, opportunities opened up for socially-peripheral 
founders to create ventures. Founders are generally portrayed as ‘legitimacy-seekers’ for their 
new ventures (O’Neil & Ucbasaran, 2016)—they seek legitimacy by (1) establishing, based on 
their values and beliefs, “what matters to me”, (2) focusing attention on their audiences by 
establishing “what matters to them” and finally, (3) finding a balance between the two—“what 
matters to me and them”. Therefore, it appears important that founders engage in reflection to 
adjust their legitimacy work to their audiences but “without the entrepreneur feeling overly 
compromised” (O’Neil & Ucbasaran, 2016: 134).  
In addition, a new venture is judged more favorably when it portrays a legitimately 
distinctive identity (Navis & Glynn, 2011), which involves ‘legitimizing claims’ aligning the 
venture with institutionalized conventions and also ‘distinctiveness claims’ that distance it from 
such institutionalized conventions in meaningful ways. The balance appears to depend on the 
environment. For example, for new market categories, the founders’ emphasis is likely on 
distinctiveness from established market categories (Navis & Glynn, 2011). To obtain legitimacy, 
founders have to highlight their credentials—education, experience, family background, and 
status—which represent signals to external audiences that they are in line with stakeholders’ 
expectations (Nagy et al., 2012). The founders can also engage in impression management to 
highlight certain aspects and disguise others with the purpose of influencing audiences’ 
perceptions (Barsness et al., 2005).  However, some of the founders’ efforts to establish 
legitimacy may step over an ethical line by, for example, telling legitimacy lies, i.e., intentionally 
misrepresenting the facts in a “manner intended to deceive” (Rutherford et al., 2009: 954). 
Third, legitimacy can impact access to human capital, which is of critical importance 
to new ventures. Consistent with Navis and Glynn (2011) above, to attract potential employees, 
new ventures need to balance distinctive employment-claims (e.g., a supportive work 
environment) with founder and new-venture legitimacy claims (Moser et al., 2017). In a study of 
job seekers, Moser and colleagues (2017) found that, in comparison, distinctiveness claims were 
more important for potential employees than legitimacy claims. More specifically, highly 
innovative employees were mostly attracted by the new venture’s distinct ideology— 
“commitment to a valued cause”—and founders’ legitimacy, i.e., founders educated at a 
prestigious university and with professional experience at a renowned firm. 
Finally, establishing new venture legitimacy involves a process over time. For 
example, Tracey, Dalpiaz, and Phillips (2018) explored the legitimation process of ‘translated’ 
ventures, which try to loosely emulate a business model in one geography (e.g., business 
incubators in Silicon Valley) and launch the venture in another geography (e.g., Italy). This study 
found three phases in the legitimation process, as follows: (1) improvising phase when founders 
try to explain the venture to local level stakeholders (i.e., in Italy); (2) converging phase in which 
the founders attempt to explain the venture to categorical level stakeholders (i.e., incubators in 
Silicon Valley) in an effort to secure access to resources from them, and an (3) optimizing phase 
that involves using local characteristics to achieve distinctiveness at an international category-
level and also using international category-level authentication to achieve distinctiveness at the 
local level (Tracey et al., 2018: 1638).  
There also appears to be a dynamic process between the reputation and status of a new 
venture, as these two attributes are mutually dependent. Reputation is an economic concept that 
refers to the “perceived of actual quality or merit that generate earned, performance-based 
rewards” (Washington & Zajac, 2005: 283) and status is a sociological concept that refers to 
social rank reflecting privilege or discrimination (Pollock et al., 2015). Pollock and colleagues 
found that (1) reputation’s positive relationship with status is magnified for older firms, (2) big 
hits (such as a blockbuster IPO for venture capital firms) increases status for young firms and 
enhances reputation for older firms, and (3) prior status influences current status but less so as 
the firms age. For new ventures, the reputation of their first partner had an immediate and 
ongoing impact of the firm’s status (Milanov & Shepherd, 2013). Part of the process of 
establishing legitimacy for the new venture is enrolling stakeholders in the new venture’s 
endeavor. Stakeholder enrollment refers to the process of “creating deep psychological bonds 
between stakeholders and entrepreneurial endeavors” (Burns et al., 2016: 97). When the new 
venture is shrouded in uncertainty, efforts at stakeholder enrollment need to focus on the founder 
and the founding team not the nature of the potential opportunity (see Haveman et al., 2012). 
Founder Exit  
Founder exit refers to an individual who was involved in the creation of a venture leaving 
his or her role as owner and/or manager with that venture. There are numerous exit strategies 
(Bruce & Picard, 2006; Ryan & Power, 2012) and modes of exit (DeTienne et al., 2015; 
Wennberg et al., 2010) available to founders. We investigate founder exit in terms of the 
different antecedents of involuntary exit and the reasons for voluntary exit.  
First, there is heterogeneity in the likelihood of founder exit. For example, founder 
exit is more likely for ventures that are older and larger (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; Dobrev & 
Barnett, 2005) because the venture needs shift from tasks requiring entrepreneurial skills to tasks 
requiring management skills (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Wasserman, 2003). Given this change 
in the nature of the required tasks, the venture benefits from replacing the founder with a 
professional manager (Ewens & Marx, 2017; Wasserman, 2017), who can provide a different 
skill set (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). The implication is that the founders’ exit is forced upon 
them by the investors. Founders are more likely to withstand this pressure and remain with their 
firms if they have experienced success at their previous firm, have prior affiliations with the 
other members of the founding team and have prior start up experience; environmental 
uncertainty magnifies these positive relationships (Boeker & Fleming, 2010).   
Counterintuitively, Wasserman (2008) offers a founders’ dilemma in which the more 
successful the founder is as CEO growing the firm, the more likely he or she is to be replaced. It 
appears that success in the form of growth increases the likelihood that the new firm will require 
external funding (and more of it) and that these investors, with greater control of the company, 
will replace the founder with a professional manager. Generally, it seems that founder-CEOs are 
more likely to be replaced if the firm is performing among the worst in the industry or amongst 
the best in the industry; founder replacement is driven by a mismatch between the quality of the 
business and the ability of the founder (Chen & Thompson, 2015). Interestingly, while those 
firms that replaced the founder CEO were more likely to fail, those that survived grew at a faster 
rate (Chen & Thompson, 2015) and had a more positive investor reaction at IPO (Nelson, 2003) 
than those firms who kept the founder CEO. Indeed, recent empirical research indicates that 
venture performance typically increases when investors replace founders with professional 
managers (Ewens & Marx, 2017; Wasserman, 2017).  
Second, founders may choose to exit the venture voluntarily, for a number of 
reasons. For example, a founder may exit their venture to avoid further losses (despite a 
reluctance to do so; DeTienne et al., 2008; Huang et al., forthcoming; Gimeno et al., 1997). In a 
recent study, Souitaris and colleagues (2019) found that founders voluntarily exited their 
ventures, in full or in part (exited management or ownership), when they became frustrated by a 
loss in power over the direction of the venture. Managers may also voluntarily exit their ventures 
as a positive harvest strategy (DeTienne & Cardon, 2012).  
EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT AND STARTING UP A NEW VENTURE  
A startup’s external environment refers to the context beyond founders and their 
emergent ventures. We investigate the external environment in terms of its imprinting effect, the 
types of external environments that impact the startup process, and the government as an external 
environmental actor. 
First, the external environment can imprint on new ventures. Imprinting explains how 
individuals and organizations develop characteristics during a sensitive period (usually at the 
time of creation) that persist despite the passing of time and environmental changes (Marquis & 
Tilcsik, 2013). Mathias and colleagues (2015) found that founders can be (1) imprinted by their 
family and friends, in which case they are more likely to pursue multiple unrelated ventures; (2) 
imprinted by their hobby, in which case they focus on user communities to inform their decision 
making and are are less motivated by pecuniary returns; and (3) imprinted by prior work 
experience, in which case they focus on known knowledge fields, and emphasize growing their 
ventures. Moreover, the initial mode of ideation appears to have a persistent impact. Specifically, 
founders who initially engage in organizational knowledge brokering—“the ability to effectively 
apply knowledge from one technical domain to innovate in another”—bring a positive impact on 
search patterns over time, which leads to superior performance vis-à-vis non-brokers (Hsu & 
Lim, 2013: 1134). It also appears that environmental imprinting is related to the masculinity or 
femininity of the industry in which the new venture is created; Micelotta, Washington and 
Docekalova (2018) found that new ventures created based on identity claims associated with 
being female in a male dominated industry experienced the liability of differentiation—the 
disadvantage of offering a feminine unique selling point to differentiate from competitors in a 
masculine industry. 
Second, the nature of the external environment can directly impact the creation and 
performance of new ventures. By investigating new ventures across different environments, 
Katila and Shane (2005) found that new ventures are more innovative in markets which are more 
competitive, attract more financial resources, are less manufacturing-intensive, and are smaller. 
In addition, new digital technologies can impact the creation of new ventures. Specifically, von 
Briel, Davidsson, and Recker (2018) proposed six enabling mechanisms, attributed to digital 
technologies, that affect the new venture creation process (for example, compression 
mechanisms accelerate the time required to perform an action and conservation mechanisms 
reduce the required resources to perform an action). Differences in the external environment can 
also occur across countries. For example, De Clercq, Lim, and Oh (2013) found that the positive 
relationship between the founders’ resources and the likelihood of starting a new venture is more 
positive in countries where the financial system is more entrepreneurially oriented, the 
educational system is more developed, the level of trust is higher, and the culture is less 
hierarchal (i.e., little desire among country members to preserve existing power structures) and 
less communal (i.e., country members view themselves as autonomous) (Schwartz, 1999). 
Finally, government can influence the external environment of new ventures. 
Specifically, government policies can facilitate or obstruct new venture creation and 
performance. One study in Israel found that government subsidies for research and development 
were associated with the attraction of external investment, innovation, and new firm survival 
(Conti, 2018). Another form of subsidy is guided preparation for entrepreneurial activity, i.e., the 
providing of “advice, education, and awareness” provided to new ventures (Rotger et al., 2012). 
In an investigation of a guided preparation program for nascent and new founders in Denmark, 
Rotger and colleagues (2012) found that the program had a positive impact on the size of the 
new ventures and their survival, but not necessarily their growth. As indicated above, 
governments can be a source of resources for new ventures. To access these resources, founders 
can offer bribes, which constitutes an illegal activity. In a study of nascent entrepreneurs in 
China, Baron and colleagues (2018) found that entrepreneurs were more likely to offer bribes to 
government decision makers when the local economic conditions were declining, and even more 
so for entrepreneurs who had an underdog identity—i.e., difficult to change personal 
characteristics that are perceived by members of society as low in social status.  
AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are ample opportunities for future research to contribute to the entrepreneurship 
literature on startups and new ventures, prior to scaling. Although we could offer future research 
within each of the categories (i.e., boxes and circles of Figure 1), we prefer to focus on the 
arrows for a number of reasons. First, the papers reviewed within a category each offer a future 
research section that are useful in describing future extensions of the current models. Second, the 
arrows represent the connections between major constructs and therefore offer both a broader 
basis for speculating on research opportunities, the opportunity to combine and re-combine these 
conceptual chunks to develop new theorizing (i.e., theory bricolage [Boxenbaum & Rouleau, 
2011]), and a focus on the mechanisms connecting them which is critical to strong theorizing 
(Anderson et al., 2012). Third, a focus on the arrows forces us to think about causality, reverse 
causality, mutual dependence, and the possibilities of virtuous or vicious spirals. Finally, a focus 
on the arrows also provides a basis for calling for more process-based research. 
Founder and founding team. Although there has been considerable scholarly attention 
on the solo founder, and to a lesser extent the founding team, there is a need for research that 
connects the two. First, in a group of founders why and how is one chosen to be the lead 
founder? Of course, even this question has implicit assumptions that need to be explored. For 
example, perhaps a lead founder is not chosen but emerges from the team formation and 
activities involved in startup. It would be interesting to have a deeper understanding of the 
process of choosing a lead founder and/or how he or she emerges over time. Furthermore, in 
what way does the lead founder lead? And non-lead founders follow? At this early stage of team 
formation, in a highly uncertain environment, current theories of leadership and leader-member 
exchange are unlikely to directly apply, requiring theory extension or new theories. 
Founder, team, and social network. Although we are beginning to understand how a 
team’s knowledge is developed, we are less clear on the aggregation process by which each 
individual member’s social network and capital are combined to influence enrolling stakeholders 
and engaging a community of inquiry. Again, we have a rich understanding of an organization’s 
network and the benefits (and constraints) of that network. It seems that we are only starting to 
gain an understanding of how networks are formed in the first place and how that formation 
facilitates and is facilitated by the processes by which the founding team is formed (including the 
leadership of the lead founder), the identification of a potential opportunity, the formation of a 
community of inquiry, the enrollment of stakeholders, and progress in organizational emergence. 
Indeed, the field has made come important steps along this path largely by exploring the creation 
of new venture capital firms (references here maybe). Although new venture capital firms are 
new ventures, extending this stream of research to other contexts will be important to determine 
whether important aspects are different and consequential, such as the nature of the potential 
opportunity, the formation and maintenance of a community of inquiry, the dynamic within the 
founding team, and aspects of the environment such as the nature of uncertainty (for example, it 
is likely that a non-venture capital new firm may find it more difficult to establish a portfolio as a 
means of managing uncertainty than a new venture capital firm). 
Founder cognitions and community of inquiry. We are also taking some important 
steps in building on our understanding of potential opportunity, as a result of entrepreneurial 
cognition research, to acknowledge the importance of a community of inquiry. However, we 
believe that current research has only scratched the surface of this important research topic. For 
example, it is important to understand how the cognitions and actions of different sub-
communities within the community of inquiry directly influence a founding team’s collective 
cognitions and actions and do so indirectly through their interaction with the potential 
opportunity. Thinking of the potential opportunity as a boundary object, such as a prototype 
(perhaps a minimum viable product), how does the interactions proceed between (1) the 
community of inquiry, prototype, and founder and vice versa, (2) between one sub-community, 
the prototype, and another sub-community of inquiry, and (3) the lead founder, the prototype, 
and the rest of the founding team. Perhaps because the notion of opportunity has been rather 
amorphous, there has been little research on these relationships. However, as we focus more on 
potential opportunities, and their different manifestations, we are at the dawn of a new era of 
entrepreneurship research that explores the dynamism of communities of inquiry, potential 
opportunities as boundary objects (including prototypes), and founders. 
Community of inquiry and emergent organizing. While we are gaining a deeper 
understanding of how founding teams engage in the activities of emergent organizations, there 
are other relationships that have received less scholarly attention despite their apparent 
importance. We argue that it is important to understand how a community (or communities) of 
inquiry influence (and are influenced by) the potential opportunity and by other aspects of 
emergent organizing. For example, to what extent (and how) are communities of inquiry 
responsible for aspects of emergent organizations, such as the sequence of nascent activities and 
the quality and speed of completion of those activities? And how does the nature of the potential 
opportunity (e.g., prototype or minimum viable product as manifestation of potential 
opportunity) indirectly influence organizing activities through the input of the community of 
inquiry? Moreover, it is likely that there are sub-communities with an indirect role in the 
emergence of the new venture and perhaps also in the emergence of the overall community of 
inquiry, based on how they engage with and/or disengage from one another. Why and how are 
some sub-communities involved in the organizing activities while others are not and when does 
sub-community input obstruct rather than facilitate progress in emergent organizing? There is 
also much to learn about how founders “manage” members of the community of inquiry, how 
members of the community of inquiry “manage” founders, and how sub-communities “manage” 
other sub-communities throughout the emerging organizing process. 
Emergent organizing and new venture strategy. Although we have a substantial 
stream of research which is self-labeled as new venture strategy, much of this literature applies to 
new ventures beyond the startup phase (and thus beyond the focus of the current study), for 
example focusing on return on investment or other growth outcomes more appropriate for 
scaling ventures than for startups. Not only do we need research on the strategies of early-stage 
new ventures and more proximal outcome variables, there is an opportunity to better explore the 
relationships between emergent organizing and new venture strategy. Future research could 
explore how different emergent organizing processes or paths lead to the formulation and 
enactment of different strategies. Indeed, emergent organizing provides an opportunity to 
theorize and empirically explore how the building blocks of a new venture’s strategy are 
initiated, developed, and deployed. For example, by investigating the role of the founding team 
on emergent organizing activities we are likely to gain a deeper understanding of the creation of 
capabilities, routines, norms, organizational culture, and so on as the basis (or perhaps even the 
dynamic outcome of) a new venture’s strategy. Understanding the micro foundations of new 
venture strategy will make important contributions to both the entrepreneurship and strategic 
management literatures. 
New venture strategy and outcomes. There are research opportunities to extend and 
develop new theory on the relationship between the strategies of startups and proximal outcomes. 
Such research can build on the sociological research on legitimacy to explore how new ventures’ 
strategies can increase legitimacy (or otherwise limit the downside effects of liabilities of 
newness), make the most of low legitimacy (in what ways can low legitimacy represent a 
potential advantage and how can that advantage be exploited?), and whether there are 
illegitimate new venture strategies that are effective at building legitimacy (i.e., extending the 
work on legitimacy lies). Moreover, the nature and level of organizational emergence is 
important in understanding the relationship between new venture strategies and legitimacy. 
Indeed, future research can explore the direct and indirect (via organizational emergence) impact 
of new venture strategies on legitimacy. There might be instances in which new venture 
strategies that promote rapid organizational emergence, have a negative relationship with 
legitimacy (e.g., growing too fast is consistent with the notion of a bubble or perhaps unethical 
behavior). Moreover, while potential stakeholders provide or assign legitimacy, it is important to 
understand how various forms and levels of legitimacy influence changes in the composition, 
diversity, and usefulness of the community of inquiry and how these effects impact subsequent 
processes, including refinement of the potential opportunity, emergent organizing, and changes 
in the new venture’s strategy (e.g., a pivot). 
Organizational emergence and founder exit.  There has been limited but highly 
important research on founder exit. Future research can extend these studies and/or theorize 
anew on how the different forms, progress, and paths of organizational emergence impact the 
time, the type, and the reactions to founder exit. Perhaps the effectiveness of new venture 
strategy for rapid organizational emergence leads to the involuntary exit of the founder (i.e., in a 
similar logic to the founders’ dilemma [Wasserman, 2008]). Perhaps the founders exit is driven 
by the community of inquiry. It could be that as the new venture process proceeds and the nature 
of the community of inquiry and/or stakeholders change and/or the nature of the potential 
opportunity changes, so too does the requirements, expectations, and satisfaction with the current 
lead founder. In contrast, perhaps some founder exits involve dynamics internal to the founding 
team. Given that we do not have a good understanding of how the lead founder becomes the 
leader, enacts his or her leadership, and have others follow, it is not surprising that we do not 
have an adequate understanding of the internal processes by which a lead founder is replaced, 
and the consequences for the motivation and togetherness of the founding team, going forward. 
External environment and entrepreneurial agency. Although there is a recent 
emphasis on context (Welter, 2011) and an understanding of how the environment can impact 
the startup of a new venture (Fritsch & Storey, 2017), there is more to learn about how the 
players in the process of starting up a new venture can both adapt to changes to the environment 
and, by their actions, change the environment. How does the emergence of a new venture, 
pursuing a particular opportunity with a particular community of inquiry, and with a particular 
founding team, enact substantial changes to the environment? Therefore, we hope future startup 
research does not take the environment as some static, all-powerful force but explores 
entrepreneurial agency—how new ventures can substantially change the environment for 
themselves and others. Such an approach is particularly important when thinking about how new 
ventures can improve (or destroy) the natural environment, improve (or destroy) the economic 
and social welfare of others, and improve (or destroy) cultures and communities. Of course, as 
we recognize the role of the startup process on the external environment, there are opportunities 
to explore the causes, nature, and consequences of a mutually dependent relationship between a 
startup and the external environment (for the startup, for other startups, for founders and 
founding team, for stakeholders and communities of inquiry, for organizational emergence, and 
for the new venture’s [and other new ventures’] legitimacy). Although challenging empirically, 
we believe it is critically important that future research investigate the reciprocal nature of the 
relationship between starting up a new venture and the external environment. 
From startup to scale up.  Future research can continue from where we stopped—
linking the process of starting up a new venture to the process of scaling a new venture. We 
believe too often the startup and scaling stage are merged (or the differences ignored), which has 
obstructed knowledge creation. Therefore, there is considerable opportunity to explore how the 
startup phase impacts the scale-up phase. Although some activities may remain consistent across 
phases, there are likely a number of changes that indicate the need to transition, a number of 
changes to implement the transition, and a number of changes in both the inputs and outcomes of 
the transition from start up to scale-up. We believe research at the interface of the startup and 
scale-up phases can make important contributions to the entrepreneurship literature and provide 
an important bridge to the strategic management literature. 
Conclusion 
New venture creation is at the core of the field of entrepreneurship and is also 
informative to the broader field of management. The literature on new venture creation has 
rapidly evolved in the past two decades. Hence, in this paper, we reviewed the new venture 
creation literature subsequently to 2003.  Based on a systematic review of 143 papers published 
in our top management and entrepreneurship journals, we inductively generated a framework. 
Our framework aims to provide a comprehensive view of the literature until today. We then offer 
a road map for future research on creating new ventures, focusing less on extending our 
knowledge within each subtopic separately, and more on understanding the links between the 
sub-topics. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of Prior and Proposed Research on Starting Up New Ventures 
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